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   <updated>2013-06-18T02:59:05Z</updated>
   <subtitle>The GlobalSecurity.org SITREP blog provides diverse perspectives on military, security, and related topics. Unlike the website, which sticks to the facts, it is a venue for opinions. If you are a blogger or other writer in search of an audience, toil in obscurity no more.</subtitle>
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<entry>
   <title>The Edward Snowden affair demolishes US cyberwar hype</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130617908-the-edward-snowden-affair-demo.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.908</id>
   
   <published>2013-06-17T23:25:44Z</published>
   <updated>2013-06-18T02:59:05Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Edward Snowden affair has done many things. One of the most signal is its complete destruction of the US government/national security megaplex&apos;s campaign of cyberwar hype, disinformation and outright lying....</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="General Interest" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
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   <category term="566" label="cyberwar" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2393" label="Edward Snowden" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2165" label="Keith Alexander" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2358" label="leaking" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2395" label="National Security Agency" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2397" label="PRISM" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2399" label="secrecy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2400" label="surveillance" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      The Edward Snowden affair has done many things. One of the most signal is its complete destruction of the US government/national security megaplex&apos;s campaign of cyberwar hype, disinformation and outright lying.


      <![CDATA[
In the weeks preceeding the emergence of Edward Snowden's information on cyber-spying the US government had been conducting a carefully staged p.r. operation to paint China as the primary sinner in cyberspace. China was a country that was not playing fair, one targeting our networks and "intellectual property" in the cyber equivalent of a clandestine war. 


This was said, most notoriously by National Security Agency director Keith Alexander, to constitute "the greatest transfer of wealth in history." The economic future of the United States was imperiled by Chinese espionage. 


The Snowden affair has silenced Alexander on this matter. If only for the time being. And the crisis has forced the four-star general to explain, a job he has performed very poorly, what US cyber-spying and cyberwar operations are really up to.


And what is it that the US government, the NSA, the military and its intelligence agency contractors are up to? That's easy to summarize. It was so before Edward Snowden spilled the beans to the Guardian.


<strong>The US has been quietly building the biggest cyberwar machine in history.</strong>


And it's aimed wherever they want it to be aimed.


This is not much of a surprise but it is good that Edward Snowden has given us a first-hand look at it.


The US outspends every other nation, in every facet, of military development and deployment.


Why should cyber-operations be any different?


The hypocrisy on the subject, practiced by the majority of the US mainstream media is overwhelming.


A couple months back, while writing a look back at the fifteen-year American history of threat inflation in cyberspace and the origins of talk about digital 911's and Pearl Harbors, I noted the mainstream media had gone absent. Quit. Gave up. Kicked the bucket.


It stopped serious reporting on many national security issues and almost completely took up the government line that many enemies were preparing to cut the country down through remote manipulation on the world wide networks.


The media completely went over to the national security establishment side, accepting without question, the regular script: The United States was being surveyed and probed, its networks penetrated in advance of a time when <strong>the financial system would be attacked, nationwide power blackouts caused, the water poisoned, almost all facets of modern life disrupted.</strong>






In choosing to pass this all on, at the whims of any anonymous government or industry source peddling it, the press was just a conduit, a bilge pipe, a stenography pool for the spreading of what's called "chumpbait." Critical response, I remarked -- half jokingly, had been banished to, at best, 140-character tweets on Twitter.




The week leading up Snowden's expose delivered <em>a perfect example </em>of US cyberwar chumpbait. 




The <em>Washington Post</em> had been leaked a "confidential" portion of a Pentagon report on China. The "confidential" part was said to reveal massive Chinese infiltration of US networks and the making off with unspecified details on expensive and very important US weapons systems.




At the time, SITREP noted:



<blockquote>If you've been following along it's no secret the US government and the national security industry have been waging an increasingly concerted campaign to increase cyber-defense spending. The linchpin of the strategy is the relentless argument that Chinese hackers, under the guidance of its government and military, are into all American corporate business, military networks and the nation's infrastructure. Because of this catastrophe looms.


Another ploy in this orchestrated theatrical production arrived today in the guise of the Defense Science Board report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat ...


However, it is not the same report the Washington Post's Ellen Nakashima publicized in a big story on alleged deep Chinese cyberespionage directed against the US military and its arms manufacturers.


"Designs for many of the nation's most sensitive advanced weapons systems have been compromised by Chinese hackers, according to a report prepared for the Pentagon and to officials from government and the defense industry," writes Nakashima for the Post.


The public version of the DSB report contains only three instances of the word "China" and only one of "Chinese." "Espionage" appears only four times in report's 146 .pdf pages.


What does this mean?


It means one of the Defense Science Board's members or minions -- which can be any number of a pool of representatives from arms manufacturers like Boeing and Northrop Grumman, to consultants to these same businesses or small national security "think tanks" or lawyers in legal firms providing consultation on cybersecurity issues under contract to the Department of Defense -- leaked the real report, the "confidential" part, to the Washington Post.


These are never selfless acts to get word out about an emerging national threat. That's not how things work.


What it is is another report, among an increasing number, aimed at growing the national security industry's cyberwar and cyber-defense programs, in which many of the Defense Science Board's members are employed.


The secret report, the one the Washington Post tells us about, is to redirect attention toward a new threat. It is part of a national argument that generally lumps all cyber-crime , cyber-spying and claimed cyberwar into one big threat aimed at the United States, over everyone else.
</blockquote>


That campaign had been effective until the arrival of Edward Snowden in the pages of the Guardian. All week long US newspapers had been filled with pieces on how the administration was going to get tough with the Chinese premier at a summit in southern California. The Chinese would be told their cyber-espionage would no longer be tolerated. There would be consequences if they did not shape up.


The stories published in the Guardian blew that away. When it is shown the US has the biggest cyber-surveillance operation in the world and that it's aimed at American citizens and heavily involved in operations against foreign countries, not the least of which is China, the complaint that our country is allegedly being picked on unfairly in cyberspace is unsustainable. 


Leaks aimed at fostering government and industry agendas on national security have always been applauded. They're perfectly acceptable shoeshine, propaganda and media manipulation for furthering national security aims. They're invariably aimed at increasing budgets and the rationalizing of doing things to others. In this case the outrage comes from the news that its the American people, first, who've had things done to them, without being told or asked. 


On the other hand, Edward Snowden-style leaking, material that shows what the national security complex is doing without official permission, stuff that immediately starts up an acrimonious global stink, is abhorrent, even treasonous.


So what's all this crap about the United States having a free press?  Yes, it's a free press. Free to pass on everything that power wants said, free to not be much interested in anything else until compelled to by an Edward Snowden.


<hr>


In 2012 I wrote someting for Federal Computer Week, describing to its readers, the culture which may have influenced the mindset of Bradley Manning. It extends to Edward Snowden, too, both leakers in the sense of revealing truth about power, not at all like those who, on government contract, tip the media for the purpose of spreading chumpbait.


<a href="http://fcw.com/Articles/2011/01/31/FEATURE-WikiLeaks-workforce-George-Smith-GlobalSecurity.aspx?Page=2">Excerpted:</a>


<em><blockquote>Back in the early 1990s, I edited an electronic newsletter that dealt with the culture of amateur virus writers -- hackers who wrote mobile malware. Julian Assange was a subscriber. This is only to illustrate Assange's bona fides as someone from the original world computer underground, a place where one of the driving philosophies was to reveal the secrets of institutional power.


Once confined to what was considered a computer geek fringe, that ideology is now entrenched. It's no longer an outsider mindset, and it hasn't been for a long time. Now it's inside, with its originators entering middle age. And younger adherents of the philosophy are coming along all the time.


They're everywhere -- employed by government, the military and corporate America. And because we have come to the point that the United States is considered by some to be a bad global actor -- whether you share that point of view or not -- the government is faced with a problem it cannot solve. Its exposure is thought by many to be deserved.


In this new reality, as in nature, a vacuum is abhorred. The mainstream media no longer fulfills the role of speaking truth to power. It opened the door for Assange and WikiLeaks ...</blockquote></em>


"But the good news [for the federal government and its contractors] is that, although you can't eliminate the Bradley Mannings, they won't be common," I continued.


And they are not. In fact, I've been surprised -- even dismayed -- at how so many of Edward Snowden's colleagues remain silent in view of what they must see as things Americans ought to know about.


In 2013 America, money, a good job and a security clearance does buy a lot of silence. Our national security complex is not a culture of bold iconoclasts ready to make life-changing sacrifices. This makes Edward Snowden legitimately remarkable.


Originally <a href="http://blog.dickdestiny.com/">published at Dick Destiny</a> blog. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/?page_id=7603">About the author.</a>

]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Ricin Pinup Girl Arrested </title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130607907-ricin-pinup-girl-arrested.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.907</id>
   
   <published>2013-06-07T19:41:58Z</published>
   <updated>2013-06-18T03:17:23Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The national micro-fad of summer ricin mailing has produced a lot of firsts, not the least of which is the debut involvement and arrest of a beauty queen/actress/serial wife, Shannon Rogers Richardson, apparently intent on framing her husband. And showing a disagreeable side to the...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
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   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      The national micro-fad of summer ricin mailing has produced a lot of firsts, not the least of which is the debut involvement and arrest of a beauty queen/actress/serial wife, Shannon Rogers Richardson, apparently intent on framing her husband. And showing a disagreeable side to the President and Mayor Michael Bloomberg.
      <![CDATA[
<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/castrbeanzrichardson.jpg />


<a href="http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18829206-texas-woman-arrested-in-ricin-letters-to-obama-bloomberg-officials?lite">From NBC news, a short time ago:</a>


<blockquote><em>Shannon Rogers Guess Richardson of New Boston, Texas, originally called the Federal Bureau of Investigation claiming that her husband had sent the [ricin] letters, officials said. The investigators found that she had sent the letters herself, they said.


Richardson is an actress with minor roles on television shows like The Walking Dead and the Vampire Diaries, and was arrested in Arkansas on charges that will be filed Friday afternoon ...</em></blockquote>


Ricin mailing in the US has set a grotesque and unusual standard in the US during the last sixty days.


The firsts:


<strong>Two out of the three cases are implicated in attempts to frame acquaintances.</strong> J. Everett Dutschke, as outlined in a grand jury indictment handed down earlier this week, sent ricin letters as part of a plot to frame Paul Kevin Curtis.  And now Shannon Richardson is added to the list.


<strong>There has also never been any time in American history when so much castor powder ricin-tainted mail was sent to gain attention.</strong> It's never happened before. In fact, it's never happened anywhere globally, as far as I know, ever.


<strong>It is the first time in American history that a president, Barack Obama, has been sent, not one -- but three -- letters tainted with ricin.</strong> Ricin mailing (not powder hoax mailing) is a phenomenon recent in American life and three poison letters to the president, from three different people -- in Mississippi, Washington and Texas, is another dubious global standard setter. This never happens anywhere else.


In fact, it has never happened to any other president. Coincidence? Yeah, sure.


Our country has a small number of ricin crackpots. And what's one of the first things they've thought of when concocting their schemes? Sending mail to Barack Obama! And it's all been just serendipity, the idiosyncratic flights of fancy in perturbed minds. Right.


Our ricin mailers say much about American society in 2013. And what it says people don't like to talk about much, that's for sure.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/shannonrichardson.JPG />
<em>From her Facebook page, did Shannon Guess Richardson not like her husband and the President?
</em>


<hr>


Ricin will never be a good weapon. But because of the war on terror millions of Americans believe just the opposite. And to this day, many counter-terror experts with zero practical knowledge in biochemistry continue to tell anyone who will listen that it is easy to make.


Castor meal, or what results after castor seeds are ground are about five percent protein. A five percent nitrogen content in castor meal comes with the protein and that is why it was used as fertilizer when the US still had a large castor farming and milling business.


Of the protein content in castor seeds, some is ricin. This is easily illustrated using SDS gel electrophoretic analysis of castor powder samples. (Which is just what a national bioterror defense lab in Maryland does when it receives samples recovered in ricin cases.)
  

Here is what a sample recovered from a ricin case looks like, analytically.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/sdspagecastormashpelletfromseedsmall.JPG />
<em>Examples from a ricin domestic terrorism case in the US begin in the lanes to the right of the clear lane. The single band lane to the left is a lab ricin standard. And the arrow denotes ricin component in the crude mixture from castor seeds.</em>


The above shows a crude but complex mixture, of which ricin is only one part. Active ricin exists within it but it is far from pure.


And this is why the recipes on the Internet are irrelevant except as lures and news items to be gawked at. They don't do anything practical in the sense of a biochemical purification process.


No pure ricin is ever produced in domestic ricin case. It's way beyond the capability of those who've been caught doing it.


Occasionally, someone departs from the script that ricin is easy to make and attempts to find someone who can really explain the nature of it.


<a href="http://www.mininggazette.com/page/content.detail/id/530110/Ricin--Understanding-potential-weapon.html?nav=5006">Today, from the small newspaper, The Mining Express of Houghton, Michigan:</a>


<blockquote><em>Sarah Green, chair of the Tech chemistry department, said ricin stops all cell activities of the organism it attacks. However, ricin is effective as a weapon against humans only under certain circumstances ...


In order for ricin to be effective as an airborne substance, Green said it would have to be a very fine powder and a huge quantity, perhaps tons, would be needed to make it a weapon of mass destruction ...


Despite its possible toxicity, Green said only someone with a training in chemistry could make ricin an effective weapon.



"It takes quite a bit of purification," she said..
</em></blockquote>


People who actually know the protein chemistry business realize that production of "tons" of ricin is a ludicrous proposition.


Decades ago the US military tried to make a weapon out of ricin. It even filed a patent, one which became a contentious matter after 9/11.


But the patent, <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/nsn/nsn-040723.htm">which I described many years ago here</a>, was developed by those operating in the dark on the true nature of ricin. Because of that, their work actually degraded ricin.


And there has never been any compelling evidence that this old US military work on "weaponizing" ricin was effective.


Despite all this, the US mainstream media will never get with the program. It's too complicated a story. And that means less eyeballs for the website page.


The damage wrought is irreversible. The lore on ricin is deeply dug in and we will always have a small number of very suggestible, angry and disturbed people who pound castor beans, a first among western nations.


<hr>


Related: <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/?cat=118">A general history of ricin cases during the war on terror</a>. (Many pages long.)


<em>Originally published at Dick Destiny blog. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.</a> George Smith has consulted in domestic and foreign ricin cases.</em>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Ricin Bean Pounding: Welcome to the new weird</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130601906-ricin-bean-pounding-welcome-to.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.906</id>
   
   <published>2013-06-01T18:13:00Z</published>
   <updated>2013-06-18T03:18:42Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Welcome to the new weird. The fresh batch of ricin letters has uncovered a bean-pounder, or bean-pounders, even stranger than Tupelo, Mississippi&apos;s accused ricin guru, guitarist and karate instructor J. Everett Dutschke. If you thought ricin mail was already bizarre, it just got a whole...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
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   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      Welcome to the new weird. The fresh batch of ricin letters has uncovered a bean-pounder, or bean-pounders, even stranger than Tupelo, Mississippi&apos;s accused ricin guru, guitarist and karate instructor J. Everett Dutschke. If you thought ricin mail was already bizarre, it just got a whole lot more so.
      <![CDATA[
<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/bloombergletter.JPG />
<em>Castor powder blob letter to Bloomberg.</em>


I consider it a given you're either wholly or somewhat insane to pound castor beans and mail the powder to the president and other officials. And inside the house at 111 Maple in New Boston, Texas, something is very insane.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/ricinbabe.jpg />
<em>Shannon Guess Richardson of New Boston, TX, a ricin babe?</em>


The FBI detained Nathaniel D. Richardson of New Boston on Thursday after his wife , Shannon Guess Richardson, tipped authorities that she'd found a suspicious material in Tupperware in her refrigerator as well as searches for ricin on the home computer.


The FBI picked up Richardson for questioned and dispatched its mobile evidence and WMD units to the Richardson household, which was flipped.


While castor seeds were found in Nathaniel D. Richardson's car, under questioning he amazingly claimed they were not his and that it was the wife who had sent the poison letters to the President and Mayor Bloomberg. The FBI released Richardson yesterday, although he remains a suspect.


Richardson's wife has now come under suspicion.


Shannon Guess Richardson had been married three times prior to Mr. Richardson. And with five children from the priors, plus another on the way, the marriage is headed for divorce. (Coincidentally, accused ricin mailer J. Everett Dutschke has been married three times.)


Of course, the upshot is that as in the case of J. Everett Dutschke, this is more dual use ricin mail, poison letters to frame someone you wish to be rid of, and for officials. But who is the framer and who the framed? Or is it a husband-and-wife ricin-mailing team that has now fallen into scapegoating?


This is what the FBI is attempting to sort.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/shannonrichardson.JPG />
<em>Did Shannon Guess Richardson not like the President?
</em>


Domestically, castor seeds have occasionally been used in plots in which one spouse tries to poison the other. Most famously, a woman named Debora Green tried to poison her husband with ricin in the early Nineties. <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Bitter-Harvest-Ann-Rule/dp/0671868691">Green was only successful in making the man deathly ill although she did later burn down the family home, killing two of her children.</a>


However, copy cat use of ricin mail to the President and others in framing an acquaintance or your spouse would appear to be totally unique at this point in American history. Is the primary motivation for the ricin mail a frame job, or getting crazy words out to the President and others? Or do they share equal weight?


In less than sixty days, at least three different individuals, in three different states (Mississippi, Washington and Texas) have sent ricin mail to the President and others. One is most certainly a frame job. The third may also turn out to be so.


Everyone knows that the President, and important people in general, never open their mail. (A reader puckishly remarked that nobody earning over $30,000/year in America opens their own mail.)


Everyone also knows that thanks to the war on terror and anthrax mailer Bruce Ivins, mail to important people is rigorously checked for nasty things. This guarantees that ricin mail is quickly discovered, although the occasional letter may go awry from the collection, as one aimed at the CIA in the Matthew Buquet case seems to.


The discovery of ricin mail immediately triggers an FBI dragnet, with results as have been seen.


This makes the "why" of ricin-mailing unfathomable. Castor powder is obviously not good for framing others. And sending it to the President will inevitably result in embarkation on a long custodial trip.


Ricin mail is crazy and now, virtually always suicidal. Yet ricin mailers persist! They seem without mercy. Does it not occur to them that the only people who will handle their nasty-grams are those in exactly the same economic circumstances?


They are just cruel and irrational. In addition, it seems the detection and apprehension of them, while necessary, is one helluva a waste of taxpayer money.


Welcome to the empire in 2013, from land of the free to land of debris. There's certainly a book in it.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/shannonrogers.jpg />
<em>Can haz castor seeds?</em>


<hr>


In an abrupt change from the war on terror years, officials have apparently realized that more than a decade of telling everyone that ricin is easy to make and that castor bean mash is deadly has been counterproductive.


In fact, one can add that this particular received wisdom has some bearing on why America seems to have more bean pounders than anyone else.


From Fox:


<em><blockquote>Officials cautioned that there is "a significant difference" between a trained scientist weaponizing the ricin extracted from castor beans and an individual "taking some castor beans, running them through a coffee grinder, and soaking them in acetone" - a crude and ineffective homemade process that officials said would only be liable to induce, in a recipient foolish enough to go so far as to swallow the contents, symptoms as mild as diarrhea.</blockquote></em>


<hr>


Related: <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/?cat=118">A general running history of ricin cases during the war on terror. </a>(Many pages long.)


Originally published at Dick Destiny blog. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.</a> George Smith has consulted in domestic and foreign ricin cases.]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Bean Pounding: Unknown violent gun nut implicated in ricin mail</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130530905-bean-pounding-unknown-violent.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.905</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-30T17:19:44Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-31T16:56:46Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Three incidents with ricin-tainted mail between April and May constitute new and uncharted territory in the US. And in two of the instances ricin mail targeting the President has been intercepted. The first, from alleged castor bean pounder J. Everett Dutschke in Tupelo, Mississippi. And...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
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   <category term="2368" label="castor seed" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1772" label="extremism" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2370" label="gun nut" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2117" label="guns" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2364" label="POTUS" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="519" label="ricin" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2372" label="ricin mail" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2366" label="Shreveport" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2374" label="violent right" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[Three incidents with ricin-tainted mail between April and May constitute new and uncharted territory in the US. And in two of the instances ricin mail targeting the President has been intercepted. The first, from alleged castor bean pounder J. Everett Dutschke in Tupelo, Mississippi. And now from Shreveport, LA. (Update: The FBI now reports the ricin letter mailings allegedly by <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/2013/05/22/bean-pounding-a-new-one/">Matthew Buquet</a> in Spokane, WA, also include one to the President. That makes three in three, a 100 percent hit rate.)]]>
      <![CDATA[
<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/castorseed.jpg />


This is a remarkable series of events, one that should shock Americans. Because while no one has been killed or even seriously made ill in any of the attacks, ricin mailing is insane behavior. And real ricin mailings (as opposed to powder hoaxes), which seem to immediately inspire copycat mail, has never happened.


Perhaps years down the road, there is a Ph.D. thesis in the psychology of domestic poison powder mailers in it. Who thought unrelated people could be so psychotic utilizing the same poison powder ploy?


The newest ricin incident contains a message -- one to the mayor of New York, and a similar one to the President, that marks it as gun nut hate mail, perhaps from Shreveport, Louisiana.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/bloombergletter.JPG />
<em>Note blobs of castor powder containing ricin and oil stains on Bloomberg letter.</em>


Reprinted:


<em><blockquote><strong>You will have to kill me and my family before you get my guns ... Anyone [who] wants to come to my house will get shot in the face. The right to bear arms is my constitutional, God-given right and I will exercise that right till the day I die. What's in this letter is nothing compared to what I've got planned for you.</strong></blockquote></em>


To date no domestic terrorist has produced pure ricin.  What is produced is the crude powder of castor seeds. It contains some ricin.


No one has ever been killed in a domestic US ricin incident.


However, now we're in new territory, at least for the short term.


The people who mail ricin-tainted letters likely know, at least in a vague way, that their mail will be intercepted if it is sent to any official of great importance. 9/11 and the
anthraxer, Bruce Ivins, saw to that.


They also must have at least vague recognition that the FBI's WMD unit is now well-prepared to track such cases and there is a good chance they will be arrested.


When ricin mail arrives and a determination is made that active poison is present, one can imagine the FBI and other federal agencies immediately using Internet search, as well as their own tools, to scour the web for language similar to the messaging in the ricin mail.


This can be one Achilles' Heel of the ricin mailer. Another vulnerability is the existence of confidants.


It is one thing to listen to a loony acquaintance rail about the president, or Mayor Bloomberg, and how they will make a poison powder. It is quite another to read in the newspaper that such a thing has been done, that castor beans have been pounded, the words are nationwide, and you might have an idea who did it.


Considering all these things, the three back-to-back ricin incidents indicate a threshold has been crossed. These are people who perceive that they may certainly be caught.


But they do it, anyway. In this case, the individual appears to want <em>everyone</em> to know his words. He is sending a message. It is quite an unusual standard.


This marks a strange and grotesque period as the country enters the summer of 2013. Crazy people engaged in a small and unconnected, but still quite astonishing, national group ricin mailing.


It's a first in attempted American bioterrorism. We're Number 1, the exceptional country.


<img src="http://www.dickdestiny.com/sdspagecastormashpelletfromseedsmall.JPG" alt="" width="438" height="281" />
<em>Analytically, what a castor powder mixture containing ricin looks like after SDS gel electrophoresis. Examples from a ricin domestic terrorism case in the US begin in the lanes to the right of the clear lane. The single band lane to the left is a lab ricin standard. And the arrow denotes ricin component in the crude mixture from castor seeds.</em>


<hr>


<em>Update</em>


Possible hit or blind alley?


<a href="http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/05/31/187468451/reports-texas-man-questioned-about-latest-ricin-letters">Just in from the wire:</a>


<em><blockquote>"Authorities, including the FBI, questioned a New Boston, Texas, man Thursday night in connection with an investigation of ricin-laced letters sent to government officials, including President Barack Obama," KSLA-TV in Shreveport, La., reports.


According to ABC News, a source familiar with the case says investigators consider the man to be a person of interest at this time. The network writes that the source says the man's wife "called authorities after she noticed strange material in her refrigerator, and noticed computer searches for ricin."</blockquote></em>


<hr>


The grinding or pounding of castor seeds into castor powder containing ricin has its roots in the violent far right in the US. As far back as the late Eighties, American men in this demographic were interested in it, publishing recipes for the process in their pamphlets and books. The books and writings were devoted to collecting knowledge on how to use and make improvised weapons in an insurrection against the US government, or for use in a race war.


Many of the recipes for ricin now found on the Internet descend from the writings of Kurt Saxon, first in a pamphlet called <em>The Weaponeer</em>, and later in <em>The Poor Man's James Bond</em>.


The newest case of ricin mail with its letters threatening the President, Mayor Bloomberg and to his Washington-based gun control group, implicates a philosophy not uncommon in the country's violent far right.


The old blurb on the back of Saxon's <em>The Poor Man's James Bond</em>, has relevance in relationship to the implications of violence, outright threats, in this fresh collection of ricin letters:


Saxon reads:


<em><blockquote>"It is bad to poison your fellow man, blow him up or even shoot him or otherwise disturb his tranquility. It is also uncouth to counterfeit your nation's currency and it is tacky to destroy property as instructed in [the chapter] Arson and Electronics ...

 
"But some people are just naturally crude ... It is your responsibility, then, to be aware of the many ways bad people can be harmful ...


"Also, in the event that our nation is invaded by Foreign Devils, it is up to you to destroy them with speed and vigor. Or -- and perish the thought -- if our Capitol should fall to the enemy within, I expect you to do your duty.


"It is right to share with your enemies, the knowledge in this wonderful book ..."

</blockquote></em>


This bleak philosophy, or attitude -- if you will, has long been associated with America's violent right.


<hr>


Related: <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/category/ricin-kooks/">A general history of ricin cases during the war on terror.
</a>


Originally published at Dick Destiny blog. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.</a> George Smith has consulted in domestic and foreign ricin cases.

]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Cyberwar, cyberespionage and media manipulation</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130528904-cyberwar-cyberespionage-and-me.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.904</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-28T23:07:05Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-29T16:48:35Z</updated>
   
   <summary>If you&apos;ve been following along it&apos;s no secret the US government and the national security industry have been waging an increasingly concerted campaign to boost cyber-defense spending. The lynchpin of the strategy is the relentless argument that Chinese hackers, under the guidance of its government...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="General Interest" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Homeland Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="National Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="322" label="China" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2339" label="cyberespionage" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="283" label="cybersecurity" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="566" label="cyberwar" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2357" label="Defense Science Board" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="569" label="hacking" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2358" label="leaking" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="570" label="malware" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2360" label="media manipulation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      If you&apos;ve been following along it&apos;s no secret the US government and the national security industry have been waging an increasingly concerted campaign to boost cyber-defense spending. The lynchpin of the strategy is the relentless argument that Chinese hackers, under the guidance of its government and military, are into all American corporate business, military networks and the nation&apos;s infrastructure. Because of this catastrophe looms.
      <![CDATA[
Another ploy in this orchestrated theatrical production arrived today in the guise of the Defense Science Board report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat. 


The report is <a href="http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf">here.</a>


However, it is not the same report the Washington Post's Ellen Nakashima publicized in a big story on alleged deep Chinese cyberespionage directed against the US military and its arms manufacturers.


"Designs for many of the nation's most sensitive advanced weapons systems have been compromised by Chinese hackers, according to a report prepared for the Pentagon and to officials from government and the defense industry," writes Nakashima for the Post.


The Post's report never makes clear if classified information was taken. And it informs that internal US government discussion of some of the incidents with China is now over a year old.


What does seem to be secret, but in a selective way, is the Defense Science Board report.


The Post reporter delivers the information on Chinese cyber-espionage, writing that it comes from a "confidential" section of the report not included in the copy made generally available to the public.


One of the definitions for "confidential" in Merriam-Webster is "<a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/confidential">private, secret</a>."


The public version of the DSB report contains only three instances of the word "China" and only one of "Chinese." "Espionage" appears only four times in the report's 146 .pdf pages.


What does this mean?


It means one of the Defense Science Board's members or minions -- which can be any number of a pool of representatives from arms manufacturers like Boeing and Northrop Grumman, to consultants to these same businesses or small national security "think tanks" or lawyers in legal firms providing consultation on cybersecurity issues under contract to the Department of Defense -- leaked the real report, the "confidential" part, to the Washington Post.


These are never selfless acts to get word out about an emerging national threat. That's not how things work.


What it is is another report, among an increasing number, aimed at growing the national security industry's cyberwar and cyber-defense programs, in which many of the Defense Science Board's members are employed.


The secret report, the one the Washington Post tells us about, is to redirect attention to a new threat. It is part of a national argument that generally lumps all cyber-crime , cyber-spying and claimed cyberwar into one big threat aimed at the United States, over everyone else.


Nakashima's report for the Post grudging includes the information that spokesmen for the Chinese government have complained that it is the victim of hacking and cyberespionage, too.


Indeed, a recent set of articles in the Financial Times on the subject includes an analysis that recounts internal cyberespionage in China, a case in which groups of young hackers invade Chinese firms, as well as those in other countries, in collection of information and e-mails which can be sold to competing firms or used in extortion schemes.


China's corporate security businesses are not as mature as American competitors, the FT informs. As a result, criminal hacking groups and espionage efforts can be very successful.


<a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/20442304-bedb-11e2-a9d4-00144feab7de.html#axzz2UWmQUjHU">Reads the FT:</a>


<em><blockquote>China's leading internet security firms such as Kingsoft, Qihoo 360, Inspur, Topsec or Venustech have little or no ambition in investing in forensics, the capability that supports long-term, in-depth analysis of the origin, structure and technical detail of past attacks that is being built by firms such as Symantec or TrendMicro. "Our internet security sector is light years behind the US, partly because there is very little awareness of the problems yet and companies are not willing to pay for such services," says Tony Yuan, head of Netentsec, a Beijing security company ...


For Chinese experts, therefore, foreign complaints about hacking attacks originating in their country are far down the priority list. "Those who accuse the Chinese government of cyber attacks lack sincerity," says Liu Deliang, a cyber law expert from Beijing Normal University. "Cyber crime is the main problem and we should close ranks to fight it."</blockquote></em>


Obviously, the Chinese read the Washington Post and they are not naive. 


They know how the system works in America, too. And they are unlikely to be cowed or embarrassed by a newspaper story about a "confidential" Pentagon report, news of which is a fairly obvious case of insider manipulation. Of course, everyone connected with the DSB report knows this, too.


Thought question: <em>What's the difference between a good leak and a bad leak?</em>


Answer: Bad leaks are those the Department of Justice is commanded to investigate. Good leaks are when contractor/consultants give "confidential" material on an expanding national security threat to the WaPost.


Yes, China is engaged in cyber-espionage against us. The US military is the largest and most powerful in world history. It would be a surprise if everyone wasn't spying on it and its vast private sector infrastructure of giant arms and services contractors.


How do you secure such a large globe-spanning enterprise, one in which there will always be thousands of people, or even many more, who dumbly click on e-mail attachments, idly insert foreign media, go off secure protocols or copy sensitive materials to networked home or unsecured devices for convenience? Rhetorical question.


So what can be seen in the non-secret version of <em>Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat</em>?


Well, there is a loud call for mounting a big defensive and offensive military cyberwar capability, claiming that the cybersecurity threat facing the nation is equivalent to, or even more serious and complex than things like mounting strategy against the German U-boat campaign in WW2 and the achievement of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War (page 38).


Readers may recall the latter was the building of a survivable capability to blow up the entire world in the case of a doomsday thermonuclear attack.


Cyberthreats are given a taxonomy and a graphic illustration. They range from nuisances, Tier 1 threats, to Tier 6 threats, malware hardware/software as yet unmade that is an "existential" threat.


A threat to existence!


<img src=http://dickdestiny.com/existentialthreat2.JPG />


It then proceeds to explain what constitutes various tier threats.


The Stuxnet virus, which the report coyly declines to mention was developed and deployed by the United States, was a Tier 4 threat. The Agent.btz worm/malware, a piece that circulated worldwide in 2008, is given the same rating.


Which I and others would call inflated but which left a lasting scar on the US military because it demonstrated that DoD was no better at keeping viruses off its networks than anyone else.


Agent.btz is never actually named in the Advanced Cyber Threat report. Instead the authors reference only the problem contained by "Buckshot Yankee," which means nothing to laymen because it is not explained in the edition released to the public audience.


Buckshot Yankee was the name given to the operation aimed at neutralizing Agent.btz.


As an illustrative example of what constitutes a past Tier 6 threat, the DSP report comes up with the spying IBM Selectric typerwriter, machines that were altered by the Soviets to collect and transmit what was typed on them. The spying typewriters were put into US embassies in Moscow and Leningrad.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/thecyberspyingtypewriter.JPG alt="" width="386" height="249" />


A newer Tier 6 threat is what I call the Subversive Chip of Cyber Doom.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/cyberchipofdoom.JPG alt="" width="459" height="267" />


The subversive chip would work normally in US computing and weapons systems until triggered by conditions or an outside signal. At which point it could transmit compromised information or destroy the processor and operating system. 


So let's not outsource all computer manufacturing to China. Oh, wait... 


Other parts of the document discuss growing the US capacity for offensive cyberwar and establishing a "resilient" cyber force, a potentially immense open-ended project that is said to be of the utmost urgency.


<hr>


Originally published at Dick Destiny blog. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.
</a>
]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Chemical Weapons in Syria: What could the U.S. do about them?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130522903-chemical-weapons-in-syria-what.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.903</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-22T20:58:57Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-22T21:07:56Z</updated>
   
   <summary>As Daddy Warbucks once observed, &quot;You always have to skin your own skunks.&quot; Perhaps this insight is particularly appropriate if the United States adopts the elimination of chemical weapons as a goal for involvement in Syria. First of all, neither side of the Syrian conflict...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>James T. Quinlivan</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="514" label="chemical weapons" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="711" label="conflict management" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2355" label="Gulf War" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="36" label="Iraq" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="244" label="Syria" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[As Daddy Warbucks once observed, "You always have to skin your own skunks." Perhaps this insight is particularly appropriate if the United States adopts the elimination of chemical weapons as a goal for involvement in Syria.


First of all, neither side of the Syrian conflict has committed to elimination of chemical weapons. If the United States chooses to intervene militarily to stop chemical weapon use, it should recognize from the start that it has limited ability to destroy chemical munitions through strikes even if it has the ability to destroy Syrian forces. Large chemical weapon stocks will survive even a sustained bombing campaign.


Even if a new regime accepts chemical weapon elimination, glib assertions that such weapons can simply be dumped at sea or burned in place when the friendly regime is installed ignore international law and environmental and political consequences. Planning for peace needs to get past the idea of destroying targets and address how to destroy industrial scale quantities of dangerous materials in environmentally acceptable ways.  The First Gulf War is the last time the U.S. really attempted to destroy real chemical weapons outside U.S. territory. Our experience then is both enlightening and sobering.
 


At the close of the First Gulf War in March 1991, U.S. soldiers inspecting Bunker 73 at Khamisiyah found only some 122mm rockets, presumably with high explosive warheads. The soldiers set demolition charges that collapsed the bunker and inadvertently released sarin and cyclosarin nerve agents from some of the rockets. Other American soldiers downwind of the site may have been exposed to the chemical agents, producing lingering health effects. This event, along with its possible health consequences, was one incident in what came to be called the Gulf War Syndrome controversy. Much later, the Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force caused the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare a report - Intelligence Update: Chemical Warfare Agent Issues During the Persian Gulf War - issued in April 2002 that in describing the background of various chemical releases analyzes the effects of Coalition attacks on chemical weapons in 1991.  Even though this report is now more than 20 years old, it demonstrates how difficult it would be to attack Syrian chemical weapons today.
 


As the CIA report shows, the soldiers at Khamisiyah did not recognize the 122mm rockets as chemical weapons because they were not marked. Chemical weapons--aerial bombs, artillery or mortar shells, or artillery rockets--look pretty much like their high-explosive brothers in size and shape. The primary distinguishing features are usually colored bands or stenciled markings. We expect to find such markings because ever since World War I (when chemical weapons were first introduced in modern warfare) countries have used markings to prevent accidents in handling. Saddam Hussein's Iraq did not routinely mark chemical munitions (apparently relying on paper manifests): Iraqi chemical weapons were virtually indistinguishable from the hundreds of thousands of outwardly similar high-explosive rounds that filled ammunition bunkers.
 


Iraq's bulk-storage containers for chemical agents were even more anonymous than the filled chemical munitions. Not only were the containers not specially marked, but they were common to the chemical industry. Saddam Hussein's Iraq used one- and two-metric-ton containers as well as a 20-metric-ton container for mustard.  Bulk nerve agent was stored in a two-metric-ton aluminum container also used for inhibited red fuming nitric acid, itself a propellant for SCUD missiles as well as a common industrial chemical.
 


Finally, the report also shows that the intelligence community's pre-war belief that chemical weapons were associated with particular types of storage facilities was mistaken. Moreover, the Iraqis attempted to evade Coalition air strikes by moving munitions from known storage locations--sometimes into the open--and burying some bulk storage. These evasions were largely successful. The CIA assessed that "most chemical munitions were missed by Coalition aerial bombing" and that Coalition bombing had released less than 8% of the more than 700 tons of chemical weapons and bulk agents later found by the U.N. Special Commission supervising Iraqi chemical weapons disarmament.
 


In the period after the First Gulf War, the U.N. Special Commission and its successor the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission supervised the disarmament and destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons. They discovered that large quantities of chemical weapons and precursor chemicals had survived the war, and that their destruction would entail a major industrial operation.  Iraqi engineers, scientists, and technicians--still working for the Saddam Hussein regime--carried out the actual work of destruction under supervision of the U.N. specialists. The Iraqi workers were precisely those who had created the weapons in the first place and knew what they were dealing with.



Coalition bombing had only damaged, not destroyed, key components of Iraq's chemical weapons production infrastructure that could be used for disarmament, such as the Iraqi sarin plant that was converted to a hydrolysis plant for destruction of the nerve agents and their precursor chemicals.  This was a stroke of luck in dealing with hundreds of tons of the most dangerous materials. In addition, a wholly new incineration plant was designed and constructed for mustard gas and its precursors.  Finally, those chemical munitions and bulk agents that had been damaged by the Coalition strikes and rendered too dangerous for safe disposal were entombed in bunkers at the Al Muthanna site.  This work was not completed until May 1994 - more than three years after the war ended.
 


Syria shares many of the same features and scale that made Iraqi weapons such a difficult target.  The combined lessons of the attack and disarmament of Iraq's chemical weapons in the First Gulf War suggest that chemical weapons are hard to find and destroy. Lots can survive even a sustained attack. Moreover, those that remain will present a disposal operation of industrial scale and environmental concern.
 


There is no reason to believe that the U.S. is better able to deal with chemical weapons in Syria today than it was with chemical weapons in Iraq in 1991.

<ul>
	<li>Intelligence may be better than it was, but it is always imperfect. Chemical munitions are still difficult to distinguish, and storage sites are numerous and opaque. And we have enough experience with being spun tales on WMD to make us suspicious of reports from the region. The U.S. may be in the situation of having both many possible targets and real doubt that the list includes all actual storage and weapon sites.</li>
</ul>

<ul>
	<li>There are U.S. weapons with new capabilities. The American nerve agent eliminated at the Anniston Chemical Agent Facility is destroyed at 800 degrees Fahrenheit. But because the combustion products at 800 degrees are themselves unhealthy, the actual incineration process burns the agent at more than two thousand degrees to insure the safety of American citizens downwind of the plant. There are weapons that can create such high temperatures. But dropping such weapons on suspected chemical weapon sites is not the same as a reliable chemical engineering process, possible incomplete destruction leaving damaged but still lethal munitions complicating later disposal and collateral casualties from agent release need to be considered carefully as part of any targeting.</li>
</ul>

<ul>
	<li>Finally, there are those members of the Free Syrian Army who have reportedly been trained to deal with chemical weapons, matching their skills to assigned tasks needs to be considered realistically.</li>
</ul>
 

Together all could be useful tactical improvements on the performance of the First Gulf War, but they do not match the scale of the problem.  
 


If the ultimate outcome of American military involvement is to be both the replacement of the existing regime and the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, the very first task is to get agreement that the new regime actually accedes to elimination of chemical weapons. If it does, current planning must recognize that the burden of disposal will fall to external powers.  And these external powers will have to destroy the chemical weapons in Syria because no one is willing to accept them; they cannot be just dumped in the Mediterranean.



At a minimum, this means that infrastructure useful for disposal should be identified and kept off target lists.  Unlike the Iraqi situation, in which regime loyalists could be used to carry out the destruction work under supervision, the planning, manning, and training for Syrian chemical destruction will need to be based on external sources. And finally, it will take several years--as it did in Iraq-- to accomplish the destruction. During that time the material must be adequately secured by reliable forces.



Acting as if military involvement will not lead to these additional burdens and commitments would only delay adequate preparation and insure poor execution.
 


<em><a href="http://www.rand.org/about/people/q/quinlivan_james_t.html">James Quinlivan</a> is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.</em>
]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Bean Pounding: J. Everett Dutschke &amp; the strange saga of outsider music and bioterrorism </title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130521902-bean-pounding-j-everett-dutsch.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.902</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-21T15:53:14Z</published>
   <updated>2013-06-18T03:20:29Z</updated>
   
   <summary>It takes a very strange person to undertake bioterrorism in America. Logic says there can&apos;t be many such people. But the recent case of accused ricin mailer, J. Everett Dutschke, Tupelo&apos;s now most famous other son adds another entry in an obscure catalog of dimly-lit...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="General Interest" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Homeland Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="WMD" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="1077" label="anthrax" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
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   <category term="1076" label="Bruce Ivins" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2349" label="Bud Light" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="606" label="castor beans" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1576" label="country music" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2266" label="FBI" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2353" label="guitar music" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2351" label="J. Everett Dutschke" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="519" label="ricin" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[It takes a very strange person to undertake bioterrorism in America. Logic says there can't be many such people. But the recent case of accused ricin mailer, J. Everett Dutschke, Tupelo's now most famous <em>other</em> son adds another entry in an obscure catalog of dimly-lit unique coincidence and Americana.

]]>
      <![CDATA[
<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/robodrum.jpg />
<em>J. Everett Dutschke before Tupelo's bean pounding.</em>


Over the course of the last few years, J. Everett Dutschke was a man of many interests and hobbies: Karate instructor, Mensa member, someone fighting for local political office, insurance salesman and well before allegedly pounding castor beans into a crude powder, an electric guitarist and singer trying to make it with his band, Robodrum.


Dutschke recorded no less than four separate CDs, all of them sold on the world wide web and promoted around the country.


But Dutschke was not the only American accused of bioterrorism with a career, or intense hobby, in music. That history goes back farther -- to the start of the war on terror.


American bioterrorists are few in number. But they are a very modern phenomenon.


And the most famous bioterrorist of all, Frederick, Maryland's anthrax mailer, the research scientist Bruce Ivins, was also a recording musician.


Ivins, the only accused bioterrorist whose work killed people, five in the anthrax mailings of 2001, ignited a national panic and launched a bioterrorism defense industry boom that lasted for over a decade. Finally, with the FBI closing in and increasingly psychotic as a result of being ejected from America's premier bioterrorism research lab, USAMRIID at Fort Detrick, Ivins committed suicide with an overdose of acetominophen in 2008.


However, the previous years had been good. Ivins' research had flourished. He was well-known for playing music and gaily singing his heart out in bars and churches in and around Frederick.


Shortly after his death, a record-collector who is an acquaintance of the author found a vanity single made by Bruce Ivins, cast off in a record bazaar in Abbottstown, PA, about forty miles up the road from Frederick.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/bruceivinspoplarsmall.JPG />


It was legitimate homespun country music, credible cover versions of Elvis Presley's "All Shook Up" on the B-side, a rendition of another standard, "Pass Me By (If You're Only Passing Through)" on the A.


Billed as Bruce Ivins & the Country Boys, the record is credited to Nashville Recordings, "a record-making plant that did a lot of small pressings in the 70s and 80s," the collector told me. "Most likely a couple hundred or so were done ..."  (The single is archived on the web <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/2011/04/13/the-new-country-hit-infecting-the-land-extra/">here</a>.)


In the earlier part of the last decade another man who came under a cloud of suspicion after purchasing castor seeds was Robert Alberg of Kirkland, WA.


Alberg purchased five pounds worth, apparently with the intent to make ricin. After his arrest, the court recognized he was profoundly impaired and granted release under a five year parole guideline. Alberg promptly went back to trying to obtain castor seeds and was jailed.


A local editorial cartoon from the time describes Alberg's plight: "When Seattle lonely heart and autism sufferer Robert Alberg wasn't writing songs about sand and being utterly alone, trying to sell DIY hydrogen gas kits on the Internet or placing wife wanted signs about town, he was busy making the deadly toxin ricin and sending e-mails threatening to wipe out all of humanity before blasting off in a rocket ship ... He was arrested by the FBI before he could secure a recording contract," it reads.


<img src=http://homepage.ntlworld.com/casey.raymond/images/alberg.jpg />


Alberg's very forlorn acoustic music is archived on YouTube and he, or friends, have sold it as a CD <a href="http://www.cdbaby.com/cd/robertalberg">here.</a>


Like Alberg, J. Everett Dutschke stands accused of making ricin. Unlike Bruce Ivins, the anthrax mailer, recent American history has shown that castor bean pounders kill and sicken no one. 


The reason for that is easy to understand: Pounding castor seeds into a powder produces only something crude, a mixture which contains some ricin and many other things, not enough to pose any hazard to people who get the letters or handle the mail. What has been shoveled into letters in the case of J. Everett Dutschke, and a new incident this week in Spokane, WA, is not pure ricin. Pure ricin has never been recovered in any US terror investigation.


Crude castor powder containing ricin, you see, is simply not poisonous enough. 


Decades ago the US had a thriving industry deriving oil and fertilizer from castor seeds. As a result, the country had mills that produced dusts and powders as waste, which was not a significant health hazard although it was known to cause allergies and asthmatic conditions in susceptible individuals.  


Over time this common and prosaic knowledge was lost, replaced with the modern mythology of terrorism, one that trained Americans to believe ricin was easy to make simply by bean pounding.


No one can really say what attracts a few unusual American men to it.


Pure madness and mental dysfunction, social anomie, or just a bad itch, one scratched by making what they believe to be a secret deadly powder?


Of course, bean pounding never stays secret. What use is it to make such secret poison powder if others never know how clever you have been? Secret poison powders yearn to be lessons. The maker must tell friends or acquaintances or they are no good.


And so they occasionally emerge as news, something to send to others in letters so as to make fear and sensation.


In the years prior to what the FBI says was his buying of castor seeds on eBay, J. Everett Dutschke pursued musical dreams.


"There's Delta blues, Chicago blues, Texas blues, Piedmont blues and Jump blues, to name a few, but Everett 'Dusty' Dutschke is taking the blues to new places," reads a <a href="http://djournal.com/bookmark/6712607-Man-vs-machine">promotional piece on the net </a>from three years ago, also mentioning one of the four Robodrum albums, <em>Guitar Czar</em>, <a href="http://www.allmusic.com/album/guitar-czar-mw0002044359">here</a>.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/dutschkerobo.JPG />
<em>A promotional piece, in snapshot, of accused ricin mailer J. Everett Dutschke & Robodrum. Dutschke has maintained he is not guilty of the charge and the case is before a grand jury.</em>


A 2011 interview with J. Everett Dutschke, conducted by a local web DJ named Vinny Bond, is <a href="http://www.blogtalkradio.com/musiconthecouch/2010/09/21/the-chapin-sisters-dusty-the-robodrum-sit-on-the-c">here.</a>


Advance to the 67 minute mark and you'll hear the accused ricin mailer speaking about Robodrum becoming a blues disco hip-hop act. 


Indeed, there are videos of this in performance, one in Tupelo, Mississippi, in the summer of 2012, shortly before Dutschke began the ricin caper that would result in the arrest of an innocent man who was the target of a framing.


<iframe width="420" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/DvIPW7fzKI0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>


"College students are going to eat this up," said Dutschke at the time. "Isn't it exciting?"


Dutschke averred he was a "workaholic" who got only two or three hours of sleep a night. "If I hadn't been writing music for tv and movies for the last six months or so, I would have starved."


A famous TV and music composer? Certainly it was within the realm of faint possibility. But J. Everett Dutschke was an embellisher and we can find no evidence of it.


However, the summer of 2012 had J. Everett Dutschke and Robodrum in St. Louis, competing to win a Budweiser Light Battle of the Bands.


It resulted in what's now the one and only example of an American accused of bioterrorism in a ritzy promotional video sponsored and paid for by the King of Beers.


<iframe width="560" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/V5Ib6zlbI2c" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>


In make-up, glitter and sunglasses, Dutschke sings he doesn't need any fancy women, he just needs his guitar because he'll blow your house down in "Big Bad Wolf," a song from a Robodrum album of the same name. "Enjoy Responsibly" reads the big beer vendor's subtitling on the video.


It was at the same time that Dutschke was beginning to attract notice from authorities in Tupelo.


As the Washington Post put it, for a recent feature:


<blockquote><em>"In June, he was charged with indecent exposure by the city attorney's office after several neighborhood children came forward.


" 'He would get the attention of the girls with a green laser. He would hit the laser and click it around until they started to look into his house. Then he would expose himself,' said Dennis Carlock, whose 13-year-old granddaughter was one of the victims and testified to the incidents."</em></blockquote>



In Robodrum promotional material, Dutschke's band was also said to incorporate lasers in its stage show.


Dutschke was convicted for exposing himself to kids in the neighborhood. He would later be charged with three counts of fondling minors at his karate studio. He was awaiting trial on it when ricin letters arrived in the mail to a Mississippi senator and the president during the week of the Boston marathon bombing.


What had happened? Was pounding castor seeds in the karate studio in an apparent plan to frame a local foe, Paul Kevin Curtis, something spontaneous, a malicious brain worm? Or just something the ricin mailer knew would be a big thing, a lunge at a very peculiar sort of fame before being embarked on a long custodial sentence?


At the time, a former newspaper reporter and journalism professor at Ol' Miss, Curtis Wilke, made the observation:


<em>"I've thought, 'God, I wish I were still a reporter; it'd be fun to cover this story ... Make a weapon of mass destruction from a bunch of beans?"</em>


The reality has turned out to be weirder than anyone could imagine, worth a book, a script, maybe a movie, and someone to show the dark and twisted in the out-of-control  mind.


<iframe width="420" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/DxsDaIwku7s" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>


In a now unsettling video for a song from J. Everett Dutschke's 2011 album, String Theory, he sings: "I don't ever want to leave this stage, I am a superhero these days."


<hr>

<a href="http://www.semo.edu/cfs/teaching/4836.htm">Title derived from William Faulkner.</a>

<hr>



<a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/?cat=118">A general running history of ricin criminals in the US.</a>



Originally published at <a href="http://blog.dickdestiny.com">Dick Destiny blog</a>. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.</a>

 

]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Crowd-sourcing our security</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130513901-crowd-sourcing-our-security.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.901</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-13T14:03:07Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-13T14:10:53Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The investigation of the Boston Marathon bombing highlighted growing public participation in protecting communities against terrorism. People on the scene before the medical teams arrived were the real first responders, as ordinary citizens always are in such cases. Shocked by the attack, Bostonians were eager...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Brian Michael Jenkins</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="1284" label="counterterrorism" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1764" label="domestic terrorism" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2345" label="intelligence collection" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2347" label="law enforcement" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="751" label="terrorism" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[The investigation of the Boston Marathon bombing highlighted growing public participation in protecting communities against terrorism.  People on the scene before the medical teams arrived were the real first responders, as ordinary citizens always are in such cases.  Shocked by the attack, Bostonians were eager to assist authorities in running the bombers down before they could strike again.  It worked both ways as police opened their filters to enlist public assistance. 
 
Spectators provided police with their videos of the event.  They assisted in identifying the bombers.  They obeyed the controversial order to stay off the streets.  It was a citizen's tip that led to the capture of the second suspect.  The spontaneous expressions of joy at the apprehension of the second suspect reflected not only relief, but also a sense of shared achievement.
 
We are entering an era of crowd-sourced law enforcement in which Americans are increasingly taking an active role in their own defense, heading off terrorist attacks in the making and joining the pursuit of those who have carried out their violent plans. 

It is not certain if public involvement on this scale reflects a fleeting sense of community caused by the tragedy or a broader trend, but it contrasts with the immediate post-9/11 years when federal officials periodically announced that credible intelligence indicated imminent danger of terrorist attack, warning citizens to be vigilant (never operationally defined), while at the same time, advising people to go about their business as usual.  
 
It was a schizophrenic message.  Warning people they might be under threat--although the risk to individual citizens was statistically minuscule--while telling them there is nothing they can do about it creates anxiety and alarm, which is exactly what terrorists seek.  And being told to stand aside was in itself contrary to American traditions of involvement, self-defense and self-reliance.
 
Citizen involvement today begins with heading off potential threats before they happen.  Relatives and friends of individuals who seem to be turning toward extremist ideologies are encouraged to dissuade them from destructive paths or report them.
 
No one knows how many times this very private intervention may occur, but when it was discovered in 2008 that young Somali-Americans were being recruited to blow themselves up in Mogadishu, the FBI and local police departments enlisted the cooperation of Somali communities and successfully reduced the flow. And five Northern Virginia men were arrested on terrorism charges in Pakistan in 2010 after the admitted jihadists were turned in to the FBI by their worried parents. 
 
Merchants are asked to inform police of suspicious purchases of substances or items that could be used in improvised explosive devices--young men buying large quantities of hair bleach for example.  Those working in specific industries, like transportation or shipping, who might encounter suspicious activities in their sectors are asked to report them.  Citizens' tips, in fact, have thwarted many terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11.
 
Neighborhood Watch is nothing new, but it has been extended beyond local vigilance to "See Something-Say Something" campaigns where people are asked to notify police of suspicious objects or behavior.  Public awareness campaigns that focused on "left parcels" in London's subways pushed would-be bombers to less lucrative targets on the outskirts of the city during the IRA's terrorist campaign. But awareness of bombs left in public places didn't help when suicide bombers carried explosives-filled backpacks into London's public transport system in 2005. 
 
Public involvement does not end with apprehension.  The final phase takes place in a courtroom where citizens participate in the trial as witnesses, members of juries, and spectators to the delivery of justice. Treating terrorist suspects as enemy combatants, to be held indefinitely in military custody, would banish this vital finale to the invisible realm of military tribunals, and could discourage public assistance. 
 
There are downsides to public participation in security.  Citizens' tips are low-yield ore.  They can divert police resources to investigating forgotten lunch bags and the suspicions of nosy neighbors.  Crowd-sourced information requires sophisticated analysis.  Public prejudices can encourage racial and ethnic profiling. Wrong identifications can ruin lives. Public involvement does not mean self-appointed street-corner posses.  
 
A large number of citizens spending a lot of time watching each other can create a surveillance society--a nation of informants - although efforts to involve the public in the United States focus on suspicious actions, not subversive thought.  This is not a police state where citizens are pressured to report criticism of government officials or complaints about the economy.  Nonetheless, current events and technological advances have put us into new territory requiring sound judgment and new rules.  After Boston, the social media site Reddit apologized for fueling online witch hunts.  
 
Medieval law required people to raise the "hue and cry" to assist in the pursuit of criminals. Today, those shouts have been replaced by the clicks of a thousand camera-phones and text messages.  At the very least, the knowledge that their images and descriptions can be spread to millions instantly should make would-be terrorists more apprehensive.  More important, perhaps, is that involvement can transform members of the public from helpless bystanders into active participants in their own defense, thereby reducing fear and alarm.
 
Not far from the finishing line of the Boston marathon, 238 years ago another group of aroused citizens decided to defend themselves against tyranny.  How fitting then that Boston should be the place where ordinary Americans have stood their ground against the tyranny of terrorism.
 
<em><a href="http://www.rand.org/about/people/j/jenkins_brian_michael.html">Brian Michael Jenkins</a> is Senior Adviser to the President at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution.</em>
]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Pentagon declares Chinese cyberespionage the cause of all woe</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130509900-pentagon-declares-chinese-cybe.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.900</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-09T17:20:08Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-09T18:27:08Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Well, not exactly. But if you were reading the news Monday, specifically the New York Times, you might have thought this was the case....</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="General Interest" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Homeland Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Industry" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="322" label="China" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2339" label="cyberespionage" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="566" label="cyberwar" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="569" label="hacking" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2338" label="Pentagon" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2175" label="propaganda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2341" label="rent-seeking" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2343" label="the new menace" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      Well, not exactly. But if you were reading the news Monday, specifically the New York Times, you might have thought this was the case. 
      <![CDATA[
Formally, according to the Times and reporter David Sanger, the Obama administration <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/world/asia/us-accuses-chinas-military-in-cyberattacks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&hp">had seemingly chosen to allow the Pentagon to take the lead in describing the threat of Chinese cyberwarriors:</a>


<em><blockquote>The Obama administration on Monday explicitly accused China's military of mounting attacks on American government computer systems and defense contractors, saying one motive could be to map "military capabilities that could be exploited during a crisis."


While some recent estimates have more than 90 percent of cyberespionage in the United States originating in China, the accusations relayed in the Pentagon's annual report to Congress on Chinese military capabilities were remarkable in their directness. Until now the administration avoided directly accusing both the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of using cyberweapons against the United States in a deliberate, government-developed strategy to steal intellectual property and gain strategic advantage.


"In 2012, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. government, continued to be targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military," the nearly 100-page report said.


The report, released Monday, described China's primary goal as stealing industrial technology ...</blockquote></em>


The Pentagon report is <a href="http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf">here.</a>


Whether or not these Pentagon statements on Chinese cyberespionage are "remarkable in their directness," as New York Times reporter David Sanger writes, is open to interpretation.


Chinese cyberwar/cyberespionage capabilities comprise somewhat less than two pages in the entire thing. More space is devoted to China's conventional warfare capabilities and hardware, its ballistic missiles programs, it's preliminary moves into aircraft carrier aviation through the refurbishment and equipping of the old <em>Varyag</em> -- now renamed the <em>Liaoning</em>, its naval modernization and other subjects.


In fact, the Pentagon can say little about Chinese cyberespionage other than it exists and much material, from the US private sector devoted to supporting the US military, is being copied.


What benefit this has been the Pentagon does not know and cannot or will not say. No one knows. It's impossible to put a finger on the value of it to China, or precisely what losses this country directly suffers. It is an argument that has no meaning for the majority of Americans. It is something only the top most cares about. 


And that's because they can only be made to care about things they suspect may make them <em>slightly less wealthy</em>. They also care about how to redirect more taxpayer dollars for defense against threats that mean zero to the middle class while doing nothing about the major economic fail that plagues the country.


As everything having to do with public spending in 2013, the cyberwar/cyberespionage has taken on a moral issue, one hardly anyone who covers the issue will discuss. They just ignore the fact that these types of public relations maneuvers have much more to do with private sector/government rent-seeking than defending the country against anything, or even improving it.


The issue <strong>is</strong> about stealing. And it's much more about systemic stealing of money that would be better spent repairing American lives and building the future for the middle class than Chinese theft of terabytes of data.


Rent-seeking, in case you have not seen the term before, is the abandonment of providing a good product or service to customers (or one of even slightly minor social benefit) for the sole pursuit of wealth through private sector/government collusion.


And that is exactly what is happening inside the topic of cyberwar and the alleged peril of digital attack on the national infrastructure. 


This snapshot, taken a few weeks ago is rent-seeking disguised passed off as news.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/obamacyber.JPG  width="482" height="291" />


Check the key line: <em>"Intelligence officials said last month that cyberattacks and cyberespionage have supplanted terrorism as the top security threat facing the United States, and military officials sounded the alarm as well."</em>

  
The top security threat faces the majority of Americans is economic failure in this country. It's austerity, a stumbling economy, and the stunning growth in inequality leading to ever great social polarization and division.


Now, back to the Pentagon's new report on China. What about the benefits of all that cyberespionage?


In terms of what's actually happening, for example, China has not made any obvious great leap in generating a carrier battlegroup-centered navy.


On the other hand, we certainly do know that the US private sector, our multi-national corporations, are intimately involved in business relations with China. That's hardly news.


Indeed, it is safe to say that the strapped American middle class would have next to nothing if all its household consumer electronics and dry goods of Chinese origin were taken away.


If, for example, Chinese cyberwarriors are stealing Apple's secrets, what does it matter? Is Apple stopping its majority manufacturing through China?


America's electric guitar and rock amplifier companies make the majority of their mainstream goods in China. If Chinese cyberwarriors have stolen plans from Fender Musical Instruments or many other American companies, so? 


The entire American industry of pop music instrumentation manufacturing, excepting custom shop artisan work, was sent to China and other countries to increase profit margins and decrease labor costs. 


American business ceded its property to the Chinese industrial base for immediate profit in pursuit of the very cheapest unprotected manpower. Quite frequently, it gives property away just for access to lucrative foreign markets and labor.


This was done long before Chinese espionage became an issue the national security megaplex decided to exploit for the purpose of rent-seeking. 


Who are you going to find on the street who cares if Chinese cyberwarriors from a building in Shanghai are into American businesses? They've already lost their jobs or much of their earning power. And their access to the Internet is a smartphone made in China.


Take a day off from the propaganda and the memes. Corporate America isn't hiring, haven't they heard? It's not because of mass Chinese cyber-spying.


And here's one more figure from the direct American experience, furnished to again put Chinese cyberespionage/cyberwar efforts in perspective:


<img src=http://lauraslemonadestand.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/dow-and-wage-stagnation.png />
<em>You can really tell how Chinese cyberespionage/cyberwar is taking away our futures, right?
</em>


Of course, cybersecurity and management of its risk globally, is a huge problem. But it is far from the United States' most pressing security issue. The most pressing things are  on the pages of the news everyday. It's national decline brought about by profound failure in economic policy and practice. That failure directly impacts hundreds of millions of Americans each day. 


And cyberespionage has nothing to do with it.


<hr>


Here's one of the now daily examples of the looming national cyberdisaster meme, all wrapped up in less than 120 words from the wire: 


We'll lose power, then we'll drown:


U.S. intelligence agencies traced a recent cyber intrusion into a sensitive infrastructure database to the Chinese government or military cyber warriors, according to U.S. officials. 


<em><blockquote>The compromise of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' National Inventory of Dams (NID) is raising new concerns that China is preparing to conduct a future cyber attack against the national electrical power grid, including the growing percentage of electricity produced by hydroelectric dams ... 


The database contains sensitive information on vulnerabilities of every major dam in the United States. There are around 8,100 major dams across waterways in the United States.


Take a day off from the memes. Corporate America isn't hiring, haven't you heard? It's not because of mass Chinese cyber-spying stealing industrial secrets and getting into things.


One last figure, furnished to again put Chinese cyberespionage/cyberwar efforts in perspective, as they relate to the American experience ...
</blockquote></em>


<hr>


Here's another meme -- cyberwar allows small nations to punch above their weight, on repeat play.


First, at Scientific American:


<blockquote>Why launch missiles if you can switch out the lights and turn off the water. It's cheaper too. So much so that this form of attack has become a great leveller, allowing <strong>small nations to potentially punch well above their weight</strong>.</blockquote>


Next, <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/technology/outsourced-it-offers-hackers-access-to-key-control-systems-1.1379293">the same person saying the same thing, for the Irish Times:
</a>


<blockquote>"The North Koreans have been blamed for interrupting websites run in South Korea by banks, newspapers and TV companies in "a show and tell" warning about what they are capable of during a conflict, warns Sally Leivesley of Newrisk. The South Koreans have taken the warning seriously, upgrading security at their nuclear plants - including disabling every USB port in every computer at the plants lest they be used to breach defences.


"States initially used internet hacking for espionage, or intellectual property thefts, but warns Prof Woodward, they are using it for "aggressive" attacks: "This is the cool war, as some people have put it, not the cold war. Why invest in bombs and bullets when, potentially, in a shooting match you can turn out the lights, turn off the water. <strong>Some countries are really punching above their weight. </strong>They don't need a huge nuclear weapons programme."</blockquote>


And from some yob nobody knows <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/don-tapscott/review-the-new-digital-ag_b_3178215.html">at the Huffington Post:</a>


<blockquote>"Cyber terrorism. Terrorist groups and states will make use of cyber-war tactics, though government will focus on information-gathering than outright destruction. Stealing trade secrets, accessing classified information, infiltrating government systems, disseminating misinformation -- traditional intelligence agency ploys -- will make up the bulk of cyber-attacks between states. 


"Virtual statecraft. States will be wistful for the simpler days of foreign and domestic policy. Power in the physical world is no assurance of power in the digital world. This disparity presents opportunities for <strong>small states looking to punch above their weight."</strong> 
</blockquote>


<em>Cyberwar allows small nations to punch above weight </em>-- that's the new received wisdom.


Here's how to use it in an national security essay for your public nuisance defense think tank:


<blockquote>North Korea <strong>demonstrated it could punch above its weight </strong>when <strike>it quietly took its missiles off the launch platform this week</strike> it turned off all the electricity in Los Angeles County by cyberattack.</blockquote>


<iframe width="420" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/sYtJIWSqNbc" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
<em>What went to China and the national effect, effectively explained in less than two minutes</em>.


Published originally at <a href="http://blog.dickdestiny.com">Dick Destiny blog</a>. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.</a>





]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>My Plastic Gun Kills Fascists</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130507899-my-plastic-gun-kills-fascists.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.899</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-07T18:47:07Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-08T01:31:04Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The now infamous Cody Wilson successfully fired a 3D printed plastic pistol one time by hand, without maiming himself. The tech press went wild....</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="General Interest" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="2335" label="3D printing" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1395" label="arms manufacturing" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2326" label="Cody Wilson" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2328" label="gun nut culture" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2336" label="insurrection" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2330" label="plastic gun" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2332" label="tech nuisances" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2333" label="tyranny" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      The now infamous Cody Wilson successfully fired a 3D printed plastic pistol one time by hand, without maiming himself. The tech press went wild. 


      <![CDATA[
<img src=http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2012/9/25/1348578288352/Cody-Wilson-Defense-Distr-010.jpg />


From Forbes magazine over the weekend, Wilson's intellectually flimsy rationalization for making what he calls the "Liberator:"


<em><blockquote>"[Cody Wilson] prefers to think of his Liberator in the same terms as its namesake, the one built for distribution to resistance fighters in Nazi-occupied countries in the 1940s. That plan was conceived in part as a psychological operation aimed at lowering the occupying forces' morale, Wilson says, and he believes his project will strike a similar symbolic blow against governments around the world. 'The enemy took notice that weapons were being dropped from the sky,' he says. 'Our execution will be better. We have the Internet.' "</blockquote></em>


The journalist doesn't even blink.


A claim that one is symbolically and virtually making a plastic gun available to those who wish to rise up against dictatorship worldwide doesn't hold much water. The expense (at least $8k for what is Wilson's used 3D printer) makes it so that's not achievable. The people in such nations tend toward the poverty stricken. 


Wilson is also ignorant of history but perhaps this is just shamming.


Anyone even slightly familiar with WWII history knows how the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS dealt with armed resistance, partisans and uprisings -- all of which had much more than plastic guns. 


As for current belief in the efficacy of a 3D plastic gun in enabling overthrow, one considers the current case of Syria, or Libya. Or [fill in the blank, there are many options.]


It's in Wilson's career interest to foster this nonsense because he depends on philanthropic donation from other like-minded, very white, very libertarian, very right-wing nuisances with plenty of disposable income.


<a href="https://plus.google.com/+NickBilton/about">For this we can thank the NYT tech journalist who publicized Wilson to the greatest effect </a>last year, making much of his work much easier to fulfill.


<hr>


<a href="http://www.google.com/search?q=this+machine+kills+fascists&hl=en&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=wU6JUY_ZFY3wigKI_4GACw&sqi=2&ved=0CDMQsAQ&biw=1024&bih=639">Title reference, from Woody Guthrie</a>. 2013 3D plastic gun manufacturing, not exactly something he would have supported, one suspects.


<hr>


<iframe width="420" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/EhENcFTfzdQ" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
<em>Today's humorous music and video diversion on a vexing social problem.
</em>


Originally published at <a href="http://blog.dickdestiny.com">Dick Destiny blog</a>. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.</a>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Ricin case FUBAR</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130423898-ricin-case-fubar.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.898</id>
   
   <published>2013-04-23T17:51:46Z</published>
   <updated>2013-04-23T22:58:35Z</updated>
   
   <summary>In case you needed any more proof the war on terror has screwed up beyond all recognition, this just in from the AP: &quot;Marshals Service: Suspect in ricin letters case has been released from jail in Miss.&quot;...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="General Interest" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Homeland Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="2321" label="FBI epic fail" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2322" label="FUBAR" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2312" label="Paul Kevin Curtis" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="519" label="ricin" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="751" label="terrorism" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[In case you needed any more proof the war on terror has screwed up beyond all recognition, this just in from the AP: "<strong>Marshals Service: Suspect in ricin letters case has been released from jail in Miss</strong>."]]>
      <![CDATA[
In one stroke, the FBI has replayed on a smaller scale the anthrax catastrophe with Steven Hatfill, the infamous "person of interest" before the suicide of Bruce Ivins.


It unfolded slowly, with Monday's news revealing that the FBI had failed to find any castor seeds, "ricin-making materials" or internet recipes at the home of Paul Kevin Curtis.


It is a serious blow to the agency, truly epic fail, an image nightmare, throwing into question everything it has done.


What's with the ricin determinations on the letters? Are they actually reliable? Why was ricin reported in the letters? Why? Why? Why? Who has f----- up so royally?


In the past twelve years, the American government has always recovered castor seeds, castor powder or ricin recipes from those accused of "making ricin."


The FBI would have had to know, very quickly after arresting Paul Kevin Curtis, that it had a serious problem developing when it found none of these, not even traces, in his possession.


What pressure was on the agency to make a quick arrest because of the national terrorism hysteria over the Boston marathon bombing?


"[Paul Kevin Curtis'] lawyer said in court that someone may have framed Curtis, suggesting that a former co-worker with whom Curtis had an extended exchange of angry emails may have set him up," reads one emerging report from the newswire.

.
<hr>


Updated: Transcribed court proceeding from Kevin Paul Curtis hearing.
Material included -- mental history, former brushes with law, restraining order, assessment of material in letter (crude, made by throwing castor seeds in a blender), names of others, one of whom became another FBI target today.


Update II: Charges against Paul Kevin Curtis officially dropped.

<a href="http://djournal.com/view/full_story/22318834/article-UPDATE--Curtis--attorney-says-nothing-discovered-from-searches?instance=home_news_right">That material is here. </a>
 


This content was originally posted at <a href="http://blog.dickdestiny.com">Dick Destiny blog</a>. <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.</a>
  ]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>When Armies Divide: Securing Nuclear Arsenals During Internal Upheavals</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130415896-when-armies-divide-securing-nu.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.896</id>
   
   <published>2013-04-15T16:17:45Z</published>
   <updated>2013-04-15T16:26:36Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Pentagon reportedly has secret plans to secure Pakistan&apos;s nuclear weapons against terrorists, a jihadist coup, or civil war. It also has conducted war games to explore how it might try to secure North Korea&apos;s nuclear arsenal in case of a coup or collapse of...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Brian Michael Jenkins</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="2304" label="Algeria" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="301" label="France" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2306" label="Global Security Environment" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2308" label="Nuclear Terrorism" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2310" label="Nuclear Weapons and Warfare" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="120" label="Pakistan" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[The Pentagon reportedly has <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/the-pentagons-secret-plans-to-secure-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/">secret plans</a> to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons against terrorists, a jihadist coup, or civil war. It also has conducted war games to explore how it might try to secure North Korea's nuclear arsenal in case of a coup or collapse of the regime.
 
Either of these missions would be a daunting military task, requiring a large-scale military commitment. More dangerous, though, would be a mission to contain nuclear weapons in a case where an army divides against itself, creating a chaotic and unpredictable strategic landscape.
 

]]>
      <![CDATA[History suggests that armies guarding nuclear arsenals do not abandon their posts during political upheavals.  In China, the Soviet Union and Pakistan, military unity was preserved, the chain of command survived, soldiers followed orders.
 
But when armies divide, this might not be true. The difference between disarmament and disaster could well rely on the loyalty of those who have, or can gain, custody of nuclear weapons.  
 
Precedents are few, but we have one real-life case
 
In 1961, France was testing nuclear weapons at its Sahara test site in southern Algeria, an unusual situation to begin with, since French forces were at the same time engaged in a bloody war against Algerian nationalist guerrillas.  The first three nuclear tests went well, but the final preparations for the fourth test coincided with a rebellion by commanders of the French forces in Algeria who feared that French President de Gaulle was about to betray their cause and agree to an independent Algeria.
 
At the outset of the uprising, the leader of the revolt called the general commanding the test site, telling him: "Do not detonate the small bomb. Keep it for us. It may be useful." Fortunately, the rebels never followed up on the call and made no attempt to actually seize the weapon.
 
While the rebellious generals struggled to consolidate their control in Algeria, Paris pushed for the test to be conducted. And it was, although with disappointing results, leading some to suggest that the test had been deliberately scuttled to ensure that the rebels could not get their hands on the device.
 
Constantin Melnik, who was at RAND in the 1950s, returned to Paris in 1959 to become the Coordinator for Intelligence in the office of France's prime minister.  He describes a chaotic situation:
 
<blockquote>"There appeared to be virtually no government in Paris....The army [in Algeria] was in revolt...(and) 'dangerous' officers commanded French units in Germany and France....[President de Gaulle's supporters] concluded that the rebels were preparing to advance on Paris...(and) they accused the heads of the security services of being traitors....Old rusting Sherman tanks protected government buildings--they had no ammunition....A plane was ordered to be ready to bring  de Gaulle to London if the rebels attacked....The minister of defense ordered arms to be distributed to civilian 'volunteers'....One member of de Gaulle's cabinet thought the only solution was to bomb Algeria."    
 </blockquote>
In 1961, the French army's revolt was viewed as an internal matter for France.  A similar event today would be very different, but the French case foreshadowed many of the issues that would arise should upheaval grip a modern-day nuclear state.
 
Every situation is unique, highly dependent on personal relationships beyond the ken of outside observers.  There is great uncertainty about individual loyalties, which, in such circumstances, are fluid.  A nuclear weapon may be of little use as a military weapon, but could have tremendous psychological value. The ability of outside actors to understand developments, let alone influence them, is likely to be very limited.
 
With an army divided, any type of foreign intervention would be complex and fraught with extraordinary risk--success would be a long shot.  But the loss of a nuclear weapon or fissile material would change the world.
 
<i>Brian Michael Jenkins is Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation and author of the new eBook, <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB532.html/">When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals during Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars.</a></i>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Realigning Defense Workers</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130409895-realigning-defense-workers.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.895</id>
   
   <published>2013-04-09T23:13:55Z</published>
   <updated>2013-04-09T23:18:44Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Every gun that is made, every warship launched,every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense,a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. Thisworld in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Ed Corcoran</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="407" label="defense budget" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2298" label="Military industrial complex" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2300" label="military industry" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2302" label="military jobs" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[<p align="right"><font size="2">Every gun that is made, every warship launched,<br>every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense,<br>a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,<br> those who are cold and not clothed. This<br>world in arms is not spending money alone. It is<br> spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius<br> of its scientists, the hopes of its children<br>
- Dwight Eisenhower</font></p><br>
<p>There is much talk of the need to realign US defense, but little specific attention to a critical component - the need to realign defense workers. Military industry is not a jobs program. It puts national assets to nonproductive uses that national  security urgently requires.</p>
]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>But unfortunately military industry is indeed a jobs program. Any time there is a proposal for a significant reduction, there is an immediate outcry that the program in question is unquestionably critical for national security. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was set up for exactly this reason - normal Congressional procedures were simply unable to manage the political pressures generated by job losses at bases being closed. Illustrating this same problem is the F-35 fighter. It is the single most expensive program in the Defense Department budget; both the rationale for its need and its technical performance have been subjected to extensive criticism. But the main contractor, Lockheed Martin, has spread the work <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/f-35s-ability-to-evade-budget-cuts-illustrates-challenge-of-paring-defense-spending/2013/03/09/42a6085a-8776-11e2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_print.html">across 45 states</a> &#151; critics call it &#147;political engineering&#148; &#151; which in turn has generated broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, nominally for the plane but in reality for the jobs.</p><br>
<p>This challenge is exacerbated by two major trends: globalization and technological developments. Globalization has made US workers vulnerable to competition from abroad and has spurred the development of rival manufacturing centers globally, many of them even owned by US companies. This means that jobs within the United States are increasingly difficult to find, especially good paying jobs. The other piece of this challenge is that technological developments continue to increase the productivity of individual workers, so fewer workers are needed, especially less skilled workers. The papers are filled with hundreds of stories like the toll takers at the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/video/2013/03/24/us/100000002135854/a-human-touch.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130325">Golden Gate Bridge</a> being replaced by automated entry portals. Many workers in the defense industries face an additional hurdle: they are highly skilled but in very specialized fields; their jobs provide good pay but poor transferability. So well paid workers in military industry may actually have few alternatives. </p><br>
<p>Of course these workers are patriotic, sometimes excessively so. They want to feel that they are making real contributions to the nation. Understandably they are very reluctant to accept that their particular program may not really be needed, that it might actually be undermining national well being instead of supporting it. When their jobs are threatened they naturally turn to their Congresspeople - that's what Congresspeople are for. And although they may actually be a small minority of a constituency, they can be a very organized, vocal, and persuasive minority. Their concerns are reinforced by civic leaders, military leaders, industrial leaders, union leaders, and politicians. And even citizens concerned about budgets are also sensitive to their neighbors losing jobs - losses that may also impact them indirectly. </p><br>
<p>A major driver of military realignment is not just budget pressures, but strategic pressures. The new millennium has brought a <a href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/110505752-meeting-the-millennial-mismatc.htm">fundamental and largely unrecognized shift</a> in the global strategic situation. For the first time in history, the major challenges facing the nation are not military but economic.Despite bluster from North Korea and concerns about Iranian nuclear programs, the United States faces minimal actual threats to its national security. And actions in both Iraq and Afghanistan vividly illustrate the inadequacies of military force in addressing current challenges. In fact, military emphasis undermines national security in two major ways:</p>
<ul>  <li> It puts situations into a confrontational context, as well illustrated by US relations with China. China is building up military assets and threatening to dominate all of East Asia. US military responses naturally provoke further military developments. But the strategic challenge for the United States is to promote a cooperative China on the global stage; the biggest threat is that the leadership of an economically collapsing China will turn to virulent nationalism and violent confrontation to build internal legitimacy. But promoting cooperation with China requires a very different set of US capabilities and programs, promoting industrial modernization and broad social development. This same military focus was the core problem in Afghanistan; it is disgraceful that after a dozen years of US support, the country remains an economic basket case with questionable stability.</li>
<li>&nbsp;Military spending drains assets from productive programs: infrastructure modernization, human resource development, social integration. This is much more than a domestic challenge. The US economy is the bedrock of its international standing as well as its democratic government. Already significant problems are visible. Intractable employment challenges, worsened by an increasingly lopsided wealth distribution translate into millions of dissatisfied people which cannot help but breed anger, violence and crime.</li></ul><br>
<p>Freeing labor and economic resources from military programs allows them to be put to productive civilian uses. Allows, but does not facilitate. How do high performance fighter aircraft designers, submarine construction specialists, and artillery engineers find employment in the civilian sector? Any significant drawdown of military industry would necessitate a structured transition program to systematically move assets into productive uses. This means identifying in some detail projected developments in infrastructure upgrades; expansion of medical capabilities; basic research into space, brain, and computer sciences; and human resource development, as well as a wide variety of challenges from climate change. Lacking any structured approach to realigning defense workers it is clear that military industry will staunchly defend the urgency of the military requirements they support.</p>
]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Fraud Anniversary</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130322894-fraud-anniversary.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.894</id>
   
   <published>2013-03-22T17:25:25Z</published>
   <updated>2013-03-22T18:41:54Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Raise a toast to the Fraud Anniversary. For 99 percent of America it&apos;s been all downhill ever since, including me. The GWB administration and the mainstream media broke everything with the Iraq war....</summary>
   <author>
      <name>George Smith</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="General Interest" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="History" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Iraq" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="The Forever War" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="WMD" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="2292" label="anniversary" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2285" label="Baghdad" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2297" label="disgust" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2294" label="epic failure" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2287" label="Ezra Klein" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2295" label="frauds" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="36" label="Iraq" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2289" label="Kenneth Pollack" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2296" label="lies" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2175" label="propaganda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2283" label="Saddam Hussein" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2291" label="WMDs" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      Raise a toast to the Fraud Anniversary. For 99 percent of America it&apos;s been all downhill ever since, including me. The GWB administration and the mainstream media broke everything with the Iraq war.
      <![CDATA[<img src=http://media.villagevoice.com/1933754.28.jpg />


No news agency ever really recovered from the role played in supporting the frauds of the American government. They're worse now in that they've almost entirely given up on doing any critical reporting on national security issues.


<a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/2013/02/27/wtf-is-wrong-with-these-people/">As I've written recently, almost all the people I knew who actually did opposition work either quit or blew away in the intervening period</a>. Systemic apathy and indifference did them in. Being on the outside got old, people got old. I got old.


But we still have plenty of bootlicking and excuse-making.


<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-19/mistakes-excuses-and-painful-lessons-from-the-iraq-war.html">This week Ezra Klein did an "I'm sorry" piece that wasn't much of one on the Iraq war for Bloomberg.</a>


For this piece Klein went to the trouble of digging up Kenneth Pollack, a discredited national security expert whose book, <em>The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq</em>, was used by the Bush administration as part of its global p.r. push (and I do mean global) for the war. Pollack, Klein told readers, had influenced his opinion on the necessity of it. Klein had been a supporter and this week he is sorry for that.


Ken Pollack, as a Brookings Institution scholar, appeared in the news over ten years ago hundreds, if not thousands, of times. He was on television, he was on radio, he was on the Internet. Pollack was as close to being a public figure and celebrity as someone from the Brookings Institution can get.


By 2007, <em>The Threatening Storm</em> was selling for 37 cents used on Amazon. Today it's worth a penny a copy. 


What I haven't seen in the current crop of news stories, opinions and regrets on the war are any excerpts of how maddening and rotten the collected work of comment and opinion-making was at that time. Ezra Klein, for Bloomberg, didn't get into the horrendous reinforcing and congratulatory press on Kenneth Pollack's work. He didn't republish anything of the quality that makes one gag.


We'll get to what it looked like in a minute.


The little good that came from it, something Klein doesn't mention, is that Pollack and his colleague, Michael O'Hanlon, another now infamous think-tank "expert" ubiquitous in the news before the armor rolled on Baghdad, did suffer as a result of the Iraq debacle.


While they remained in the "community" of national security experts, they were thoroughly discredited. The only other person this happened to was Judy Miller of the New York Times who was run out of the profession for the frauds on Saddam's alleged WMDs published in that newspaper under her byline.


Ezra Klein, one of the alleged good guys, is a product of our culture of lickspittle. The piece at Bloomberg was as self-serving as they come, another essay to get on "most e-mailed" and read lists, as what happens with anyone who is in the small circle of anointed opinion-makers. He is sorry. Well isn't that just fine.


When it was obvious war in Iraq was coming I was <a href="http://www.villagevoice.com/2003-03-04/news/postcards-from-hell/">writing for the Village Voice</a> where <a href="http://www.villagevoice.com/2003-04-01/news/complete-idiot-s-guide-to-war/full/">I developed the Weapon of the Week series.</a>


Don't give the Voice too much credit. 


The week US army seized Baghdad and broke the back of Iraqi conventional resistance, the publisher canceled the column. They were buffaloed along with almost everyone else.


War over! Everyone was cheering. George and Dick were right. WMDs were going to be found any day. Old Don Rumsfeld was complaining the news outlets were showing the same videotapes of Iraqis stealing everything not nailed down over and over.


Yay. Don't you feel things have become so much better?!


In 2004 I was the first person in this country to find that Colin Powell's Security Council assertion that Hussein's Iraq had been connected to a ricin plot in London was a fraud. At GlobalSecurity.Org we tried to take it to US newspapers and none would have it. The systemic resistance to covering malfeasance and frauds on the war was very strong. The news had simply <em>quit </em>doing the job. (<a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/nsn/index.html">And so it was published here in early 2005</a>.)


But back to what the press really looked like ten years ago, specifically with regards to Kenneth Pollack and his work on "the case for invading Iraq."


So here it is from many years ago, a sampling of one aspect of the national propagandizing:


<blockquote>"Pollack argues his case well, going beyond the vituperative pronouncements of the administration to link operational objectives to national strategy, but he does not spend much time on the reconstruction of the country, which is, after all, the reason for invasion in the first place. He does make two noteworthy points, however: the removal of Saddam would allow for withdrawal of most of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region; and second, with its wealth in oil, Iraq can pay for its own reconstruction. Naturally, there are advantages and disadvantages to each option, and critics abound, but for Pollack the question is 'not whether [we invade], but when.' " -- from a review of the man's best-selling book in the<em> Naval War College Review, Autumn 2002</em>


<hr>



"You can tell a lot by the books people read, especially when the readers are members of Congress making life and death decisions about a war.


"Winston Churchill is big on Capitol Hill, among both Democrats and Republicans. So is Kenneth Pollack's new book, <em>The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq</em>,  whose title is derived from Churchill's  <em>The Gathering Storm</em>.


"Not on the must-read list are books like Mark Bowden's <em>Black Hawk Down</em>, a harrowing account of just how grim urban street fights can get, even for today's most elite forces. Nor, judging by interviews and the buzz on Capitol Hill, is there a surge of interest in 'hearts and minds' books on Arab history or the culture of radical Islam." -- <em>The Christian Science Monitor, December 2002</em>


<hr>


"Sean Penn needs to read [Ken Pollack's] book. So do Mike Farrell, George Clooney and all the protesters who marched and chanted against an American-led war on Iraq in cities across the world last weekend." -- <em>The New York Observer, January 2003
</em>


<hr>


" 'Saddam has taken the entire Iraqi [WMD] program on the road,' said Iraq expert and former National Security Council official Kenneth Pollack in his recent best-selling book, <em>The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq</em>." -- subsequently repeated thousands of times, like an incantation to ward off common sense, in the <em>Scripps Howard newswire, February 2003
</em>


<hr>


"Given Saddam Hussein's current behavior, his track record, his aspirations and his terrifying beliefs about the utility of nuclear weapons, it would be reckless for us to assume that he can be deterred. Yes, we must weigh the costs of a war with Iraq today, but on the other side of the balance we must place the cost of a war with a nuclear-armed Iraq tomorrow." -- Kenneth Pollack, on Hussein's alleged WMD program and the reason for war, in the <em>New York Times opinion page, February 2003</em>. One bets they wish they hadn't done that now.


<hr>



"Despite its human and financial cost (which [Ken Pollack] says could be less than we think even as we prepare for the worst), we are the only ones who can prevent the world from facing a nuclear-armed Hussein. <strong>It's in our interest; it is our duty</strong>." -- <em>Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, 2002</em>


<hr>


"While the anti-war forces are derided, the media have turned pro-war intellectuals into stars. Each time you look up, you find another interview with Kenneth Pollack, the ex-CIA analyst whose book <em>The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq</em> is the bible of war supporters." -- <em>LA Weekly, February 28, 2003</em>


<hr>


"While Iraqis 'danced in the streets of Baghdad' in DC the 'jibes were out for the naysayers who had feared a grueling and protracted conflict' to oust Saddam Hussein. VP Cheney called the war 'one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted' and 'praised the 'carefully drawn plan.' Cheney 'was riding high' 'as one of an elite corps of political prophets who had accurately forecast a quick collapse' of Saddam's regime. Cheney insisted that the war 'would last weeks, not months.' Others who predicted a short and decisive victory included Sec/Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Dep. Sec/Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Defense policy analyst Richard Perle, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), ex-CIA analyst Kenneth Pollack, and ex-Reagan admin. official Kenneth Adelman (Efron, Los Angeles Times) -- <em>Bragging Rights for Iraq, The National Journal, April 2003
</em>


<hr>


" 'It's looking like in truth the Iraqi (weapons) program was gray. The Bush administration was trying to say it was black,' said former CIA Iraq expert Kenneth Pollack, now at the Brookings Institution, a research center.


"Pollack, who advocated a war to overthrow Saddam, said he believes more evidence of Iraqi weapons activity will be found." -- <em>Knight-Ridder newspapers, June 2003</em>


<hr>


<em>The Bush administration-funded worldwide book blitz.
</em>


"Even as President Bush delivered his pivotal speech on September 12th to the United Nations regarding the conduct of Hussein's regime, we noted there was a very timely book launched at the same time by Ken Pollack of the Brookings Institute called <em>The Threatening Storm</em>. We contacted Mr. Pollack and asked him if he would interrupt his book tour, which was not that easy to persuade him to do, and he agreed and went on a number of digital video conferences and visits to countries as far spread as France, Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, and now he's scheduled for South Africa and he's agreed to do a series more. He's that third voice, and he is speaking about the cases, pro and con, of invading Iraq in a more reasoned and reasonable way than most people could, and he has another voice to offer." -- <em>Undersecretary of State Charlotte Beers, at the National Press Club, December 2002</em>


<hr>


"At a press briefing Dec. 18, State Dept. public diplomacy topper Charlotte Beers announced that her division has asked author Ken Pollack to interrupt a book tour and travel overseas to talk about his book <em>The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq.</em>


"Turns out the State Dept. also has been courting foreign journalists over the past year.


" 'We set up many more responsive facilities than we've had in the past for the foreign press at the president's ranch in Texas, at the White House and in our own State foreign press centers, which are Washington, New York and Los Angeles, Beers said."


<em>Storytelling stressed</em>


"A former Madison Avenue exec, Beers extolled the importance of "storytelling" in convincing overseas ads that the U.S. is only trying to do good." -- <em>Daily Variety, December 2002</em>


<hr>


"In fact, one of the reasons to go to war with Iraq sooner, rather than later, is so that we never find ourselves in that position where Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons and we have to risk the obliteration of Riyadh, or Kuwait, and the Saudi oil fields, or Amman, or any of the other capitals of the region that we would worry so much about. Or, for that matter, New York. If the Iraqi's decided to put a nuclear weapon on a freighter, they could just drive it into New York Harbor and have the same effect there." -- <em>Pollack, State Department-sponsored worldwide video conference, two weeks before war</em>


<hr>


"In hitting American forces with chemical weapons, Saddam would exact vengeance, said Ken Pollack, a former CIA analyst now with Brookings. He also might hope to delay them from entering the city." -- <em>Course of Baghdad Battle Hinges on Unknowns, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 2003
</em>


<hr>

" 'Unlike so many Iraqi oppositionists, [Ahmed Chalabi] actually does what he says he's going to do,' says Ken Pollack, research director at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution." -- from an article that should have been entitled, <em>"Ahmed Chalabi -- A Great Guy!" by Sally Quinn, the Washington Post, November 2003</em>


<hr>


" 'I think that we will find the [WMD] stuff,' Ken Pollack said. 'I think it's simply a matter of time, but I think that we will find, at the very least, the production capability.' " -- in <em>another State Department-funded worldwide videoconference with Ken Pollack, one entitled "Dr. Wrong, Once Again and With Passion," May 2003
</em>


<hr>


"In a New York Times op-ed piece, Brookings Institution analyst Ken Pollack writes 'the search for Iraq's nonconventional weapons program has only just begun. In the meantime, accusations are mounting that the Bush administration made up the whole Iraqi weapons threat to justify an invasion. That is just not the case - American and its allies had plenty of evidence before the war, and before President Bush took office, indicating that Iraq was retaining its illegal weapons program' " -- <em>Pollack in the NYT via the National Journal, June 2003</em>


<hr>



</blockquote>



Americans no longer have any idea who Ken Pollack is. It's been such a long time they may not remember hardly any of the details. And that's why we need to re-read stuff like this. It wasn't just bad, it was much much worse than you now recall. 


Revisit the manipulated groupthink and how hard to stomach it is. Marinate in it.


<img src=http://www.dickdestiny.com/dumbotheclown.jpg /> 
<em>Kenneth Pollack, then a very important person. Now a symbol for the time.</em>


Originally published at <a href="http://blog.dickdestiny.com">Dick Destiny blog.</a> <a href="http://dickdestiny.com/blog1/about-gsdd/">About the author.
</a>




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   </content>
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<entry>
   <title>The Invasion of Iraq: A Balance Sheet</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/130321893-the-invasion-of-iraq-a-balance.htm" />
   <id>tag:sitrep.globalsecurity.org,2013://1.893</id>
   
   <published>2013-03-21T19:24:15Z</published>
   <updated>2013-03-21T19:35:57Z</updated>
   
   <summary> Historically, wars were fought primarily for material gain: livestock, treasure, tribute, or territory. More recently, however, the profit motive for war has declined as life has become more precious and conquest and plunder have become less acceptable, although conflicts waged for control of diamonds...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Brian Michael Jenkins</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="144" label="Afghanistan" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="801" label="al Qaeda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="36" label="Iraq" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2016" label="military intelligence" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2283" label="Saddam Hussein" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="417" label="Taliban" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="873" label="WMD" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/">
      <![CDATA[ 
Historically, wars were fought primarily for material gain: livestock, treasure, tribute, or territory.  More recently, however, the profit motive for war has declined as life has become more precious and conquest and plunder have become less acceptable, although conflicts waged for control of diamonds and other precious commodities continue in parts of the world. International law generally prohibits military action by one state against another except for reasons of self-defense. In modern warfare, "gains" must be measured in less-tangible forms, such as --preserving national security, liberating threatened populations from tyranny, protecting human rights. Military action to achieve such ends is considered unavoidable and is rarely assessed as an investment.
 
The invasion of Iraq was a war of choice, however, and therefore should be assessed in terms of costs and benefits. Neither the United States nor its allies had been attacked by Iraq, and there was no evidence that any attack was imminent. Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant, and his regime was an affront to human rights, but the country had suffered under his rule for many years. Iraq's liberation was not the reason for going to war. The official purpose of the invasion was to remove any threat posed by Iraq's presumed arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Regime change was a consequence, not a cause. And although Iraq's citizens are freer now, they are by no means more pro-American.


The costs are easier to quantify than the gains. The Iraq War cost the lives of 4,480 U.S. soldiers and at least 3,400 U.S. contractors. (U.S. allies lost 318 soldiers.) In addition, 31,928 American soldiers were wounded in action, many suffering serious disabilities that will impose a continuing burden on their families and long-term costs for health care and support. Between 110,000 and 150,000 Iraqis were killed in the war, and estimates of total conflict-related deaths run as high as 1 million.
 
Estimates of the direct and indirect costs to the United States range from $1.7 trillion to $3 trillion.  Moreover, a <a href="http://costsofwar.org/">recent report</a> estimates that the total cost could reach <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-iraq-war-cost-20130318,0,1591279.story">$6 trillion</a> over the next four decades, factoring in benefits owed to war veterans. The war in Iraq did not cause the global recession, but it certainly exacerbated America's financial difficulties.
 
No weapons of mass destruction were ever found -- a lesson that even an all-out intelligence effort can get things wrong.  But this lesson comes at a cost to U.S. credibility. In the future, it will be more difficult to persuade the American public or mobilize international support for action, even when the evidence appears convincing.
 
The initial invasion was a spectacular demonstration of U.S. military might, but Iraq's subsequent insurgency tarnished that reputation. U.S. commanders finally got the measure of their foes, but learning came late, just as withdrawal became a political necessity. War-weariness is another cost.
 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also imposed serious strains on U.S. military personnel and equipment, which will require years to recover. The U.S. military undoubtedly gained experience from the two wars, but it seems unlikely that the United States will soon commit combat troops to another insurgency.
 
The invasion of Iraq was portrayed as another front in the "war on terror" -- America's response to 9/11 -- with some U.S. officials asserting that Iraq had played a role in the attacks. This claim was never supported by U.S. intelligence, and it did not drive the decision to invade, although it was used to justify the war.  Despite later public statements by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein was not responsible for the 9/11 attacks, many Americans continue to believe he was involved.
 
On balance, the invasion of Iraq did not advance the war on terror. There is, in fact, consensus among analysts that the war in Iraq diverted attention and resources away from the campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban. At the same time, it provided al Qaeda with a new front, a new recruiting poster, and a new destination for global jihadists. Always opportunistic, al Qaeda exploited the insurgency, although its bloody excesses in Iraq ultimately alienated Muslims worldwide. Al Qaeda's Iraq front survives and is increasingly active against the Iraqi government and in Syria's civil war.
 
It is not yet clear that the Iraq war has served America's security interests. While the U.S. State Department claims that the United States and Iraq have "forged a strategically important bilateral relationship," that is hard to see.
 
Iraq no longer threatens its immediate neighbors. Iran is now viewed as the most serious threat to the region; its nuclear program is real and worrisome. Iraq's Shia-dominated government seems more willing to support Iran's ambitions than to support efforts to discourage those ambitions. In more concrete terms, Iraq facilitates arms shipments to Syria's government forces, while the United States would prefer to have Syria's president step down. It is difficult to point to evidence of cooperation between Iraq and the United States other than Iraq's acceptance of U.S. assistance in building up its internal security forces to combat jihadist insurgents and, potentially, Sunni opponents.


In sum, the costly removal of a brutal tyrant who threatened his own citizens and neighboring countries won no applause, earned no gratitude, established no reliable ally, and produced no lasting strategic benefit.
 
<em><a href="http://www.rand.org/about/people/j/jenkins_brian_michael.html">Brian Michael Jenkins</a> is senior adviser to the president of the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.</em>
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